

MARITIME INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO THE



Marine Accidents Passenger Carrying RIB's 'SEAFARI HARRIER & LE MOURIER MARLIN' Between 15TH JULY & 01ST AUGUST 2021



Seafari Harrier



Le Mourier Marlin

The Jersey Administration, on behalf of the appointed Minister, conducts marine safety and other investigations on ships flying the flag of the Bailiwick of Jersey and ships which are not flying the Jersey flag which are within Jersey waters in accordance with the obligations set forth in international conventions to which Jersey is a party (either directly or through the United Kingdom).

In accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, mandated by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, investigations have the objective of preventing marine casualties and marine incidents in the future and do not seek to apportion blame or determine liability.

It should be noted that provisions in the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2012 require Masters, Officers and Owners of vessels to provide such information as is reasonably required by those appointed to conduct such investigations.

If the contents of a report were subsequently submitted as evidence in court proceedings relating to an accident there is a risk that this could offend the principle that individuals cannot be required to give evidence against themselves.

It is for this reason that the Minister is prevented under the above law from authorising publication of a report until a decision has been made not to prosecute any individual in connection with the incident concerned or any prosecution including any appeal has been completed.

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The obligation to publish accident and incident reports in accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, is an acceptable reason for publication of this report in its current format under data protection legislation.

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GLOSSARY

A&E	Accident and Emergency: Accident and emergency department of the Jersey General Hospital
AHM	(Duty) Acting Harbourmaster: A Harbour official, who has been sworn in before the Royal Court who holds delegated powers to act on behalf of the Harbour Master and Harbour Authority.
RIB/RHIB	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat: A small vessel with a rigid usually GRP hull and an inflatable buoyancy collar
SCVC	Small Commercial Vessel Certificate: A certificate issued by a professional 'Certifying Authority' approved by the Jersey Shipping Registry and issued on behalf of the Jersey Shipping administration. The certificate is issued following an inspection to ensure compliance with the applicable Workboat Code standards.
St Helier VTS	Vessel Traffic Service: A maritime traffic control and advice service provided by Ports of Jersey and co-located with Jersey Coastguard in Maritime House St Helier.

1.0 SYNOPSIS

1.1 This investigation on behalf of the Jersey Maritime Administration is being carried out following three incidents on commercially coded High-Speed passenger-carrying Rigid Inflatable Boats within Jersey Territorial waters between 15th July and 1st August 2021. All three passengers experienced back injuries and on two occasions sustained fractured vertebrae.

1.2 The incidents considered in this investigation are as follows:

1.3 **15th July 2021 ‘Seafari Harrier’ (Serious Maritime Accident):** female passenger aged 77 with a pre-existing medical condition sustained a fractured vertebra after impact with a relatively small wave whilst at 13knots during a sight-seeing trip on Jersey’s South coast. The casualty’s longstanding medical condition had not been declared to the operator and the passenger chose to sit on one of the front jockey seats, despite having been briefed on additional motion at this location. As soon as the skipper was aware an assessment was made, and the voyage was aborted; returned to Saint Helier to be met by an ambulance.

1.4 **25th July 2021 ‘Le Mourier Marlin’ (Serious Maritime Accident):** the vessel was undertaking a voyage from Saint Helier, on the Island’s South coast, to the off-lying Islets of Les Ecrehous off the North East coast of Jersey. The crew member helming under the supervision of an experienced skipper. The casualty, a male passenger with no previous history of back problems, seated in the starboard forward jockey seat, sustained a fractured vertebra. The accident occurred whilst the vessel was off Jersey’s East coast, although it could not be linked with a particular wave impact. Following the passenger’s indication of back pain and an assessment of the casualty by the skipper, the former had requested that the voyage continue. Shortly afterwards, with the passenger still in pain, it was decided to abort the voyage and the passengers were landed at St Catherine’s for return to St Helier by minibus with casualty dropped at the Accident and Emergency Department of the General Hospital.

1.5 **1st August 2021 ‘Le Mourier Marlin’ (Maritime Incident):** The vessel was undertaking a short sightseeing from Saint Helier to Corbière Light on the South West corner of the island. Sea conditions were moderate, with the head sea described as ‘lively’. With the vessel South East of ‘Jument Rock’, at a speed of 10 knots, a lady passenger in the port forward jockey seat raised her hand to indicate she was in discomfort. The vessel was stopped, and an assessment was made. The passenger advised that she had ‘jarred’ her back and was in considerable discomfort. The skipper immediately decided to abort the voyage and return to Saint Helier after the remaining passengers were landed in Portelet bay as planned. One of the other passengers called an ambulance to meet the vessel on the Albert Pontoon in St Helier, although this was not notified to the skipper or St Helier VTS. Following assessment by paramedics it was determined that the casualty did not need further assessment at A&E, as the injury was muscular and not spinal. The casualty was allowed home to rest and recover. Subsequent investigation indicated that the casualty was taking medication for a kidney and back condition which had not been declared to the operator.

2.0 NARRATIVE

General description:

2.1. **15th July 2021 ‘Seafari Harrier’:** female passenger aged 77 with pre-existing medical condition sustained a fractured vertebra after impact with a relatively small wave whilst at 13knots during a sight-seeing trip on Jersey’s South coast. Her longstanding medical condition had not been declared to the operator and passenger chose to sit on one of the front jockey seats despite having been

briefed on additional motion at this location. Once the passenger indicated that she was in pain the voyage was aborted. The remaining passengers were landed in Portelet bay as planned but it was assessed that this location with its steep steps would not be suitable for disembarking the casualty. The vessel therefore returned to Saint Helier to disembark the casualty. The Skipper called Coastguard by phone and discussed the situation. An ambulance was not called due to the reluctance of the passenger to seek medical attention. The vessel contacted St Helier VTS by VHF on approaching the port and was met on arrival by the Duty Acting Harbourmaster (AHM). Following a discussion involving the AHM the skipper and the casualty an ambulance was called by the AHM and attended the vessel.

2.2 25th July 2021 'Le Mourier Marlin':

The vessel was undertaking a voyage from Saint Helier, on the Island's South coast, to the off-lying Islets of Les Ecrehous off the North East coast. A crew member was helming under the supervision of an experienced skipper and LKE holder.

Approaching the 'Banc du Chateau', on the island's east coast, slight/moderate conditions were experienced, coinciding with heavy rain, and speed was reduced to 20 knots.

A passenger with no previous history of back issues, seated on the forward starboard Jockey seat, then raised his hand to indicate a problem. The vessel was stopped, and an assessment was made by the skipper. The passenger complained of back pain but insisted that he wished the voyage to continue.

The voyage was resumed at reduced speed but, after another six minutes, the passenger indicated he was still in pain. Following consultation with the vessel operator's, the skipper decided to divert to Saint Catherine's. Coastguard and VTS were not advised of the diversion or the cause. The vessel was met by the operator's minibus, with a 'senior long-time First Aid instructor' embarked, to transport the passenger to hospital and the remaining passengers to Saint Helier. Once again examination diagnosed a fractured vertebra.

2.3 1st August 2021 'Le Mourier Marlin':

Vessel was undertaking a short sightseeing from Saint Helier to Corbière Light on the South West corner of the island. Sea conditions were moderate, with the head sea described as 'lively', as the vessel headed west from the 'Kaines Reef' at a speed of 10-15 knots.

With the vessel South East of 'Jument Rock', with speed reduced to 10 knots, a lady passenger in the port forward jockey seat raised her hand to indicate she was in discomfort. The vessel was stopped, and an assessment was made. The passenger advised that she had 'jarred' her back and was in considerable discomfort.

The skipper immediately decided to abort the voyage and return to Saint Helier, despite the casualty being reluctant as she did not wish to spoil the enjoyment of the rest of the group. The vessel turned East and, with a following sea, a speed on 5-8 knots was maintained, eventually increasing to 10-15 knots. One of the other passengers called an Ambulance to meet the vessel on the Albert Pontoon in St Helier, although this was not notified to the skipper or St Helier VTS.

Following assessment by paramedics it was determined that the casualty did not need further assessment at A&E, as the injury was muscular and not spinal. The casualty was allowed home to rest and recover. Subsequent investigation indicated that the casualty was taking medication for a kidney and back condition which had not been declared to the operator.

2.4 Voyage preparation:

Common to all three incidents was the fact that the booking conditions for both operators requested that passengers declare medical conditions that might affect their ability to safely undertake the planned excursion. On none of these occasions were any pre-existing back issues declared.

The Standard Operating and Emergency procedures for both operators, and other operators operating similar small commercial vessels in local waters are submitted to Ports of Jersey as the Harbour Authority as part of the issue of the annual Permit to each vessel under the Regulation 6 of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Jersey Regulations.

This requirement had been introduced with effect from 1st January 2019 following the Jersey Maritime Administration's safety investigation into similar incident on 'Island Voyager' on 30th July 2018. The three incidents being examined here are the first reported since the issue of Safety Bulletin 06/2018 on 2nd August 2018 as part of that investigation.

2.4 In all three cases there is evidence that the weather conditions were carefully assessed and that comprehensive pre-departure briefings took place explaining the procedures for indicating any issue to the skipper by raising a hand, and also the difference to be expected in vessel motion between the jockey sets forward and the bench seating further aft. Two of the three casualties had undertaken such voyages in the past.

With no pre-advised medical conditions there was no reason for the skippers on the three sailings not to allow the passengers to agree their seating arrangements between them

2.5 The skippers of the vessels on all three occasions were appropriately qualified and experienced and had each been examined for their Local Knowledge Endorsement for small commercial vessels carrying up to 12 passengers, an examination which in addition to knowledge of local waters including tidal effects and overfalls included safety and emergency procedures and pre-sailing briefings.

immediate actions:

2.9 In all three cases the pre-departure briefing to passengers had been successful in stressing to the passengers the need for them to raise their hand in the event of a problem and the passenger in each case did so when they experienced discomfort.

2.10 In all three cases, as soon as the passenger raised their hand, the vessel was stopped, and the skipper assessed the problem with the passenger concerned. In the case of the Seafari Harrier incident on 15th July and the Le Mourier Marlin incident on 1st August the decision was made to abort the voyage and return to Saint Helier with the casualty, although on 15th July the remaining passengers were disembarked as planned at Portelet bay en-route.

2.11 On the Le Mourier Marlin on the 25th July, the skipper was persuaded by the casualty to resume passage towards Les Ecrehous whilst the casualty assessed his continuing levels of discomfort. This decision is considered to have been unfortunate and influenced by the casualty's desire not to spoil the enjoyment of the rest of the group. With the casualty in increasing discomfort the voyage was then abandoned some 6 minutes later.

2.12 On only one of the three occasions were either Saint Helier VTS or Jersey Coastguard advised that the respective voyages had been terminated due to a passenger with a potential back injury. In the cases where this was not done the opportunity of pre-warning the shore authorities of a potential need to facilitate ambulance transfer and enabling them to provide advice, was therefore lost. In the third case the delay in response was due to the reluctance of the casualty to accept medical treatment until the skipper's attempt to encourage her to do so was supported by the AHM

2.13 On all occasions the vessel operators were advised promptly in accordance with their respective operational procedures.

2.14 On all occasions the vessel was handled, subsequent to the injury, in a way that sought to reduce vessel motion and minimise discomfort to the casualty.

2.15 On 25th July 2021 the decision was taken on Le Mourier Marlin, in conjunction with the vessel's operator, to arrange transfer for all passengers, including the casualty, from the diversion point in St Catherine's to Saint Helier, by minibus. Although one of the company staff who attended the vessel was a 'senior long-time First Aid instructor' this course of action meant that ambulance assistance was not immediately available, and the transport of the casualty to A&E was sub-optimal. The decision was taken partly due to all passengers being very wet after a heavy rain shower encountered shortly after the passenger first advised that he was suffering back pain. Although on this occasion consideration was given to calling an ambulance; the decision not to do so was influenced by the casualty's desire 'to proceed to the hospital directly in the minibus and remain with his family who were with him on the trip'.

Actions by the Shore Authorities

2.16 On each occasion, Seafari Harrier 15th July and Le Mourier Marlin on 1st August, when contacted, the Government of Jersey Ambulance service responded to the emergency call and deployed suitable resources to assist.

2.17. Once the incidents became known the incidents were reported to the harbour authorities by the operators and Incident report forms were completed. A formal Marine Accident Investigation was commenced on the Seafari Harrier occurrence on behalf of the Jersey Administration and the Minister was advised accordingly. When the accident involving the Le Mourier Marlin on 25th July occurred an investigation into that was also commenced. The decision was then taken to merge the two investigations and to include the subsequent events involving Le Mourier Marlin on 1st August.

Although on this latter occasion the casualty's injuries would not have met the threshold for a mandatory investigation; the circumstances were sufficiently similar to enable additional helpful corroborative information to be obtained.

Subsequent Events

2.21 Discussions were held independently with both operators as to proposed ways of minimising the risks of such incidents in future. The need to improve the prominence of the requirement for potential customers to declare, at the time of booking, any pre-existing back problems or other conditions which would require a revised assessment of the conduct of the proposed voyage was identified. Both operators have made revisions to their booking process accordingly.

2.22 Contact was made with all three casualties and their version of the events and input was sought and obtained.

2.23. A draft Safety Bulletin was produced at an early stage in the investigations but it was determined, on this occasion, that publication should await the completion of the investigation and production of a draft report and recommendations in order to consider the best way of putting the information into the public domain.

2.3 CREW

The skippers of the vessels on all three occasions were appropriately qualified and experienced and had each been examined for their Local Knowledge Endorsement for small commercial vessels carrying up to 12 passengers. This examination in addition to knowledge of local waters, includes tidal effects and overfalls, safety and emergency procedures, and pre-sailing briefings.

2.4 CASUALTY VESSEL DETAILS

Type:	RIB (Ribquest)	RIB (Redbay Boats – Stormforce 950)
Name:	Seafari Harrier	Le Mourier Marlin (Formerly ‘Seafari Falcon’)
Registration Number:	JY 516	JY 473
MMSI:		
IRCS:		
Registered Length:	10.0.m	9.50m
Length Overall:	10.0m	9.50m
Beam:	3.0 m	2.88m
Draft :	0.5m	0.61m
Net Tonnage :	-	-
Gross Tonnage:	-	-
Propulsion	Twin 300 HP outboard	Twin 400HP Outboard
Year of Build:	2019	2016
Date of Registration:	10 April 2019	13 September 2019

2.5 Photographs

FIG 1 - Le Mourier Marlin



FIG 2 - Seafari Harrier



Fig 3 Seafari Harrier



3.0 FINDINGS

3.1 Certification of Vessels and crew

3.2 On all three occasions the certification of both the vessels and the crew were in date and in accordance with the requirements of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) regulations 2012.

3.3 Both vessels were commercially coded by Certifying Authorities approved by the Jersey Administration and valid Small Commercial Vessel Certificates (SCVC) had been issued and in force.

3.4 The 'Regulation 6 Permits' for both vessels had been issued in accordance with the above regulations by the Harbour Authority; following submission of copies of the SCVC and valid certificates of insurance together with the 2021 editions of the operator's Small Vessels Safety Management Systems covering Operational and Emergency procedures and Risk Assessments.

3.5 In both cases the Operators' Safety Management Systems had been fully based on the guidance issued in Ports of Jersey Safety Bulletin 06 of 2018, and with both the "Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance" and the 'RYA Guidance for Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft' being appropriately considered.

3.6 On each voyage the master and crew also met the requirements of the above regulations with the masters holding appropriate, commercially endorsed, RYA Certificates of Competency and medical fitness certificates. Each had also successfully passed an examination for a Local Knowledge Endorsement appropriate to the vessel and area of operation.

3.7 Operating Limitations:

3.8 **Le Mourier Marlin** 20Miles from a safe haven, maximum speed 40 Knots. (Cat 3R)

Seafari Harrier 20Miles from a safe haven in daylight and favourable weather (Cat4)

3.9 In practice both vessels were operating in Category 4 conditions and therefore the attached comment below applied in all three cases

3.10 Vessels that are operated at high speed carry additional risks. It is incumbent upon the operator to ensure that the master has the necessary skills and experience to ensure the safety of passengers by thorough briefing and by assessment of the physical capabilities of passengers to safely experience the voyage, with due regard to the ambient sea conditions. These capabilities must be continually assessed throughout the voyage.

3.11 The definition of favourable weather in the context of the relevant permits is defined as: wind sea and visibility conditions which are deemed by the skipper to be safe for the small vessel to operate within the limits applied to it. OR conditions existing throughout the voyage or excursion in which the effects either individually or in combination of swell, height of waves strength of wind and visibility cause no hazard to the safety of the vessel, including handling ability. In making a judgement on favourable weather the skipper should have due regard to official weather forecasts for the service area of the vessel or to weather information for the area which may be available.

3.12 It is clear from the evidence submitted that on each occasion the operator and the skipper concerned made the assessments as required above; and that the forecast conditions were not such as to have made the departure inadvisable. It is further clear that on each occasion the vessel speed was continually assessed and adjusted during the voyage to avoid excessive vessel motion and maintain the safety and comfort of the passengers. Both vessels were therefore being operated within their respective limitations and operational procedures.

3.13 Assessment of Passenger suitability for the voyage:

3.14 The booking conditions of both operators required that, as part of the booking process, potential passengers declare any medical condition, especially related to back injuries, that may make it inadvisable for a passenger to undertake a particular RIB voyage. It should be noted however that, although contained within Terms and conditions, in neither case was this requirement particularly prominent on the operator's website.

3.15 On two of the three occasions the injured passenger had a pre-existing medical condition but had failed to declare it at the time of booking.

3.16 On each occasion the skipper prior to embarking passengers had explained the different motions likely to be experienced in different passenger seats. The fact that the extent of motion and any slamming was likely to be greater in the jockey seats closest to the bow and that the seat further aft would be subject to less motion but were likely to be wetter. With no indications of particular problems with any passengers, and with the expected weather conditions being well within the vessels' operational parameters, there was no reason for the passengers not being permitted to choose their own seats.

3.17 It is not clear whether, immediately prior to embarkation, each passenger was specifically asked whether they had any history of back problems or other medical conditions that may make it inadvisable for them to undertake the voyage; or for any restrictions on where they could sit to be applied.

3.18 The operators have agreed that it would be good practice in future for these health-related questions to be asked again just prior to departure and potentially for the passengers to be required individually to sign a declaration as to their fitness to undertake the planned voyage.

3.19 Pre-voyage safety briefings

3.20 On each occasion, prior to departure, an appropriate safety briefing was held. These briefings were in accordance with the respective operator's Safety and Emergency procedures and met the requirements of the Jersey Small Commercial Vessel Code of practice and (UK) MGN 280 Annex 7.

3.21 In particular, in all cases the passengers understood that if they were in any discomfort, or had any concerns, they were to raise their hand. In each case when suffering discomfort, the passenger did so and the skipper brought the vessel to a halt, handed the con to the crew member, and assessed the situation with the passenger.

3.22 Conduct of the voyages prior to the injury of the passengers

3.23 In all cases the evidence shows that the skippers adjusted the speed of the vessels in line with the experienced weather conditions. Speed was reduced appropriately, and passenger safety and comfort considered. On each occasion the vessel was at reduced speed at the time of the passenger reporting their injury.

3.24 Actions taken subsequent to the injuries being sustained.

3.25 Appreciating the potential severity of the situation; on two of the three occasions the skipper decided to abort the voyage and return the casualty to Saint Helier at slow speed. On the Seafari Harrier incident on 15th July the decision was made to disembark the remaining passengers as planned at Portelet. This decision was considered reasonable in the circumstances and was with the casualty's agreement.

3.26 On the Le Mourier Marlin on 25th July the passenger persuaded the skipper to resume passage towards les Ecrehous at slow speed. This decision was inadvisable, as the vessel should have diverted to St Catherine's, at minimal speed notwithstanding the passenger's request. The passenger's discomfort increased and some five minutes later the vessel was forced to divert.

3.27 It is considered unfortunate that, on two of the three occasions, Jersey Coastguard/ St Helier VTS were not immediately notified of the issues experienced and the aborting of the planned voyages. It is also unfortunate that, on one occasion where an ambulance was called, the call was not routed through Jersey Coastguard and the opportunity to coordinate the response and facilitate access was lost.

3.28 On one occasion the ambulance was called by a fellow passenger and the skipper was initially unaware of the call. Passenger briefings in future should include the fact that it is essential that any such decision is made by or in conjunction with the skipper and that Jersey Coastguard must be advised of any such call.

3.29 Although the skipper on Le Mourier Marlin on 25th July, immediately made contact with his shore management, both when the situation arose and then when the decision to abort the voyage and proceed to St Catherine's was made, on this occasion shore management made the decision to collect all passengers from the diversion port, using a company minibus.

Although there was some paramedic level support, the fact that an ambulance was not called and the injured party was transported to the Accident and Emergency department by minibus restricted the available options for disembarking the injured passenger and the subsequent transport; especially in light of a suspected, and subsequently confirmed, spinal injury.

3.30 With respect to the two incidents where an ambulance was called to meet the vessels at Saint Helier, appropriate action was taken. In one case the injured party was transported to hospital and on the other, following evaluation by the paramedics, the injured party was recommended to return home and rest.

4.0 CONCLUSION

4.1 Three separate occurrences occurred on two similar commercial RIBs, involving two different commercial operators, within a period of seventeen days in the summer of 2021. On each occasion a passenger seated in one of the forward jockey seats suffered a spinal injury, in two cases the injuries sustained were of a reportable level. These were the first such cases since a similar incident involving the RIB 'Island Voyager' on 30th July 2018; following which a safety bulletin was issued, containing a number of recommendations, all of which were subsequently implemented by the Jersey Administration and local operators. Between the Incident in July 2018 and the incidents contained in this report more than a thousand voyages on small commercial ribs and over 10,000 passengers had been carried in Jersey waters without injury. All the injuries reported in the last five years on Jersey Registered RIBs have involved passengers seated in the foremost Jockey seats.

4.2 Two of the three injured parties in this report had pre-existing back problems which, had they been declared, may well have influenced both where the passenger was permitted to sit and potentially how the voyage was conducted. Declaring these issues may have resulted in a recommendation that the passenger did not sail. It should be noted, however, that the third injured passenger had no pre-existing medical issues.

4.3 The weather conditions on each occasion were within normal operating conditions. In each case, an appropriate assessment was made prior to departure, a pre-departure briefing of passengers was held, and the vessel's speed was subsequently adjusted to maintain passenger safety and comfort. Speeds at the point of injury being sustained varied between ten and eighteen knots. It is considered that reasonable care was being taken for passenger safety; and that the skippers were following their respective operator's procedures. In each case these procedures incorporated relevant guidance from both the 'Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance' and the 'RYA Guidance Notes on Passenger Safety on Small High Speed Craft'.

4.4 On each occasion the passenger signalled their discomfort, in the manner briefed prior to departure, and were promptly assessed by the skipper. On two occasions the decision was correctly made to abort the voyage and return to port. There was some reluctance on the part of the injured party in each case as they did not wish to 'spoil' the enjoyment of the rest of the group. This was, in particular, the case on 25th July aboard the Le Mourier Marlin; when the skipper was persuaded by the injured passenger to continue passage towards Les Ecrehous, at slow speed, only to have to abort the passage some six minutes later. It cannot be determined whether this passenger's injuries were aggravated during this period.

4.5 It is considered unfortunate that Jersey Coastguard and St Helier VTS were in some cases not advised as soon as the problems with the passengers were identified. This prevented coordination of ambulance attendance and the potential for appropriate advice to be sought and given. It is noted however that appropriate and early communication was made with the vessel operators by the skipper in each case.

4.6 On one occasion where an ambulance was called, the call was made by a fellow passenger and not by the skipper. On that occasion there was therefore a less than optimal level of communication involving VTS, the vessel and the ambulance service, which might have resulted in delays to the injured persons receiving appropriate attention. The decision not to request ambulance attendance on the third occasion (Le Mourier Marlin - 25 July 2021) was potentially unwise, despite being made in consultation with the operator's shore management.

4.7 Although both operators had included guidance and a requirement to declare potential health issues that may affect the ability of the passenger to undertake the voyage in their booking requirements; there were at the time no specific requirements to ask the question again to each passenger immediately prior to embarkation. It is possible that the problems with two of the injured parties may have been revealed at this point and seating adjusted or the passenger concerned being recommended not to sail.

4.8 During the consultation period for this report discussions were held with both the operators and other commercial operators of similar vessels in local waters. Discussions were also held with the Jersey Meteorological Department as a result a weather monitoring station has been re-established at the end of St Catherine's Breakwater on the east coast and similar stations are to be established on Les Minquiers and Les Ecrehous reefs. It is intended that data from these sites will be accessible on line as well as feeding into general forecasting.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 It is recommended that this report is published by the Jersey Administration, reported to IMO through the Red Ensign Group (REG), and shared with other REG members. Consideration should also be given to sharing both this report and, if accepted, the associated Safety Bulletin with both MARS and CHIRP.

5.2 It is recommended that a Safety Bulletin (provisionally entitled 'Rib & Small Commercial Passengers (need to declare relevant pre-existing medical conditions) ' be issued to remind both passengers and operators of the need for such declarations both at the time of booking and immediately prior to embarkation

5.3 Recommend to all operators of such vessels under the Jersey Flag that they review their operational procedures particularly with respect to the following prior to submitting their Operational and Emergency procedures for the issue of their 2022 Regulation 6 Permits:

- a) Assessment of forecast & actual conditions prior to departure and actual weather throughout the voyage
- b) Requirements for individual and group bookings to capture any medical conditions and history that would need to be considered and how this information is captured and passed to the client and the skipper. How this information is verified pre-departure including any changes since the time of booking. Examples of the type of condition need to be included.
- c) Passenger briefings prior to departure & requests for each passenger to confirm any medical issues which require consideration before departure.
- d) Assignment of passenger seating to minimise risk; with particular reference to jockey seats situated in the forward part of the vessel.

5.4 Recommend that Jersey Meteorological Department consider installing automated weather stations on Les Ecrehous and Les Minquiers in addition to the one at St Catherine's and enable online access to the outputs of these stations and the wave monitoring buoy.

6.0 ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN:

- 6.1 LE MOURIER MARINE: Has amended its operating procedures as follows and ensured that all skippers are made aware of the changes:
- a) Skippers **must**, upon any report from passengers of any such injury:
 - i) immediately cancel the trip, irrespective of the affected passenger's preferences.
 - ii) immediately notify Jersey Coastguard/ St. Helier VTS of the incident.

 - b) Passenger briefings now ensure passengers are aware that any involvement of emergency services must be made with the skipper's knowledge and in conjunction with Jersey Coastguard.
- 6.2 Consultation carried out with all operators of Commercial RHIBs holding Jersey Permits for the carriage of passengers to discuss the findings of this report.
- 6.3 The Jersey Meteorological department have instated a weather monitoring station at St Catherine's and are progressing plans for similar stations at Les Ecrehous and Les Miquiers reefs. A new wave monitoring buoy was installed to the South West of the island during 2021.