

**MARITIME INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION REPORT
INTO
SERIOUS INJURY TO PASSENGER
ON
RIGID HULL INFLATABLE BOAT
ISLAND VOYAGER
30 JULY 2018**



The Jersey Harbour Authority, on behalf of the appointed Minister, conducts marine safety and other investigations on ships flying the flag of the Bailiwick of Jersey and ships, which are not flying the Jersey flag, which are within Jersey waters in accordance with the obligations set forth in international conventions to which Jersey is a party (either directly or through the United Kingdom).

In accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, mandated by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, investigations have the objective of preventing marine casualties and marine incidents in the future and do not seek to apportion blame or determine liability.

It should be noted that Articles 166-169 of the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2012 and Regulation 10 of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Regulations (made under article 4 of the Harbours (Administration) (Jersey) Law 1961) require for Masters, Officers and Owners of vessels to provide such information as is reasonably required by those appointed to conduct such investigations.

If the contents of a report were subsequently submitted as evidence in court proceedings relating to an accident there is a risk that this could offend the principle that individuals cannot be required to give evidence against themselves.

It is for this reason that the Minister is prevented from authorising publication of a report under article 166(6) of the Shipping (Jersey) law 2002 until a decision has been made not to prosecute any individual in connection with the incident concerned or any prosecution including any appeal has been completed.

The Jersey Harbour Authority makes this report available to any interested individuals, organizations, agencies or States on the strict understanding that it will not be used as evidence in any legal proceedings anywhere in the world. You must re-use it accurately and not in a misleading context. Any material used must contain the title of the source publication.

The obligation to publish accident and incident reports in accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, is an acceptable reason for publication of this report in its current format under data protection legislation.

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GLOSSARY

CCTV	CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION – PORTS OF JERSEY NETWORK
IRV	ISLAND RIB VOYAGES (operating company of Island Voyager and sister vessel Intrepid Voyager)
RIB	RIGID HULL INFLATABLE BOAT
LKE	LOCAL KNOWLEDGE ENDORSEMENT; a qualification for the skipper of a commercially operated small craft issued by the Harbour Master on behalf of Jersey’s Minister for Economic Development, following examination, to those holding appropriate professional qualifications.
MGN	MARITIME GUIDANCE NOTE: Issued by the United Kingdom’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MOC	MARINE OPERATIONS CENTRE – COMBINED COASTGUARD AND VTS CONTROL ROOM
TR	TRAFFIC REPORT: Report sent to Coastguard by small craft by VHF; on departure giving vessel name, persons aboard, route/destination and ETA and on arrival at destination confirming safe arrival.

1.0 SYNOPSIS:

1.1 At 1020 BST on Monday 30th July 2018 the commercially operated rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) **Island Voyager** departed the Albert Quay Pontoons at No 5 berth in Saint Helier harbour, Jersey bound for Sark with 14 persons on-board (2 crew and 12 passengers). After passing North of Elizabeth Castle and transiting St Aubins bay at approximately 20 Knots the vessel encountered a series of larger waves whilst passing south of Noirmont Point, due to the moderate SSW'ly winds and low swell being opposed by a strong westerly ebb tide. Despite some reduction in speed, Island Voyager slammed heavily and two passengers were injured. Following assessment of the injured in the relative shelter of Portelet Bay the voyage was aborted and the vessel returned to Saint Helier; where the injured, one of whom had sustained serious back injuries, were transferred to hospital by ambulance.

2.0 NARRATIVE

2.1 Summary:

2.1.1 The commercially operated rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) **Island Voyager** departed the Albert Quay Pontoons at No 5 berth in Saint Helier harbour, Jersey at 1020 BST on Monday 30th July 2018 bound for Sark with 14 persons on-board, 2 crew and 12 passengers.

2.1.2 Wind conditions were SSW'ly 17 knots and the forecast sea conditions were approximately 1.2m. After leaving the shelter of the port, the skipper decided to take the vessel to the north of Elizabeth Castle (see Fig 1) in order to provide some protection from the elements. The vessel then transited Saint Aubin's Bay at approximately 20 Kts.

2.1.3 As the **Island Voyager** approached Noirmont Point, the sea conditions worsened with the combined effects of the wind and the ebb tide and the configuration of the bay. Speed was adjusted and the vessel altered course. The vessel then encountered a number of larger waves, the last of which caused the boat to make a significant impact.

2.1.4 As a result of the impact two passengers sustained injuries.

2.1.5 The **Island Voyager** reduced speed and sought shelter in Portelet Bay whilst the skipper assessed the state of the injured passengers.

2.1.6 After considering various options, the skipper decided to abort the voyage and return to Saint Helier at slow speed.

2.1.7 During return voyage, one of the injured passengers began to hyperventilate and the skipper contacted Jersey Coastguard to request ambulance attendance on arrival.

2.1.8 Both Injured passengers were taken to hospital; where one remained as in-patient for 9 days with spinal injuries, which have required further treatment.

2.2 CASUALTY VESSEL DETAILS

Type: Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) (Humber 10m class)
Name: Island Voyager Port of Registry: Saint Helier
MMSI Number: 235039053
Registered Length: 10m Length Overall: 10m
Beam: 2.8m Draft: 0.6m
Net Tonnage N/A Gross Tonnage: N/A
Engine Make/Model: 2 x Evinrude E-TEC 200HP outboards
(Max continuous engine power: 400HP)
Year of Build: June 2006 Build Number: HIN 09711
Date of Registration: 2006 Date of entry into service: 2006
Last Survey 11/07/2016 and annual self-certification
Number of Persons to be carried: 14 (12 passengers + 2 crew) (max loading 1050Kg)
Type of Operation: Day Charter/Trips Area Category 4
Base Port: St Helier

2.3 CREW DETAILS:

2.3.1 Skipper:

2.3.1.1 The skipper, a 48 year old director of the company which owns and operates the vessel and a qualified RYA powerboat instructor; is the holder of a valid RYA/MCA Yachtmaster Coastal Certificate of Competency with a commercial endorsement, and an ML5 Certificate of Medical fitness. He has held a Local Knowledge Endorsement (Category A3; up to 20 Miles from a safe haven), issued by the Jersey Port Authority, since July 2010 for Island waters. He has been running Island RIB Voyages and skippering **Island Voyager**, throughout that period, together with a sister vessel **Intrepid Voyager**.

2.3.1.2 On his next voyage following the incident, whilst commanding the **Island Voyager**, the skipper amply demonstrated his skill and competence with these vessels during the execution of a challenging rescue of a shipwrecked fisherman from an outlying rock on Jersey's South East coast.

2.3.2 Other Crew:

2.3.2.1 The second crew member on the day concerned was 17 years of age and the holder of a RYA Day Skipper and Powerboat Level 2 certificates. This was his first season with Island RIB Voyages.

2.4 BACKGROUND:

2.4.1 Company organisation and trip allocation:

2.4.1.1 Island RIB Voyages (**IRV**) operate two ten metre commercially coded RIBs the **Island Voyager** and the **Intrepid Voyager** on services providing trips from and around Jersey and to off-lying reefs, adjacent Channel Islands and the French Coast.

2.4.1.2 The company, originally part of a larger group, have been under the current management since 2012.

2.4.1.3 The vessels are licenced under Regulation 6 of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Regulations 2012 to undertake voyages within 20 nautical miles of a safe haven in “favourable conditions” and in daylight. The term “favourable conditions” is defined on their Small Commercial Motor Vessel Certificates as follows: “Wind, sea and visibility conditions which are deemed by the skipper to be safe for a small vessel to operate within the limits applied to it; or, in any other case means conditions existing throughout a voyage or excursion in which the effects either individually or in combination of swell, height of waves, strength of wind and visibility cause no hazard to the safety of the vessel, including handling ability”. “In making a judgement on favourable weather the skipper should have due regard to official weather forecasts for the service area of the vessel or to weather information for the area which may be available from the MCA or similar coastal safety organisation”. The term “daylight” is defined as “one hour before sunrise, to an hour after sunset”. The current permit for Island Voyager was issued on 31st January 2018.

2.4.1.4. Both the vessels have an identical seating layout of passenger seats consisting of two “Jockey seats” in the forward part of the vessel each capable of taking two passengers, abaft which are four rows of bench seats each capable of holding two/three passengers (See Fig 2). **Island Voyager** was originally constructed with such five bench seats but the arrangement was changed in 2016 to mirror that of the newer **Intrepid Voyager**. The boats’ original outfitters in Wales carried out the change.

2.4.1.5 It is noted that MECAL, the vessel’s certifying authority, acting for Jersey’s Registry of Shipping, was not formally advised of the change, but have indicated that it would have approved the request had it been made as such seats are generally considered to be safer than bench seating in such vessels.

2.4.1.5 Each RIB is required to have a crew of two, under the command of a qualified skipper holding appropriate commercially endorsed RYA/MCA certification and a Local Knowledge Endorsement issued by the Harbour Authority following examination.

2.4.1.6 **IRV** operate with three qualified skippers: the skipper on the day, who is also a full-time director of the company, and two part-time skippers. In addition, **IRV** employ a number of suitably qualified part-time crewmembers, most of whom had been working for the company for more than a year. The 17-year-old serving as the additional crewmember of Island Voyager on the morning of 30th July only joined **IRV** in 2018.

2.4.1.7 In May 2018 **IRV** accepted a booking for a group of 12 passengers to undertake a day trip from Jersey to Sark on 30th July 2018.

2.4.1.8 **IRV** management assigned the trip to **Island Voyager** with the company’s director assigned as skipper. Having dropped the passengers in Sark the **Island Voyager** intended to return to Jersey in ballast, where the skipper was to remain in command of **Island Voyager** for a subsequent three-hour trip between Jersey and the outlying islets at Les Ecrehous.

2.5 Preparations for the voyage:

2.5.1 At the time of the incident **IRV** had no formal procedures as to how to assess the “favourable conditions” as required in the vessels operating permit. Informally the operator used a wind speed of 20 Knots and combined wind/swell height of 2 metres as the criteria for cancelling a voyage.

2.5.2. On the evening before the voyage, the skipper checked the weather forecasts from a number of sources and recalls forecast winds of Force 4 improving during the day and sea heights of 3-4 feet (1 to 1.2m). The Island had experienced a period of fine and settled weather until 29th July. The Skipper reported having checked the forecast once more on the morning of 30th July, again using a variety of sources.

2.5.3 The Channel Island Shipping Forecast for the period 0700BST 30th July for the following 24 hours was issued by the Jersey Meteorological Department at 0300BST; posted on its website and that of Ports of Jersey and broadcast by Jersey Coastguard and the Local Radio Stations. (Annex 1)

2.5.4. The forecast predicted wind from South to Southwest force 4 to 5, decreasing force 3 Jersey southwards late morning, veering South West to West by mid-afternoon, decreasing 2-4 by evening, becoming variable for a time. Weather conditions were forecast as patchy mist rain and drizzle clearing by mid-afternoon. With moderate to good visibility (locally poor in the morning) and a swell of 3-5 feet decreasing 2-4 feet by midday.

2.5.5 The skipper anticipated that waves of up to 6 feet could be expected at Noirmont and the situation between Noirmont and Corbiere would need to be reviewed, however he was satisfied that he was sailing on an improving forecast and that whilst the outward voyage might be uncomfortable in places the return leg would be pleasant.

2.5.6 Prior to embarking the passengers, the Skipper decided to refuel **Island Voyager** at the fuelling berth at La Collette, just outside Saint Helier Harbour, and embarked the duty crewmember.

2.5.7. On completion of fuelling **Island Voyager's** re-entry into Saint Helier Harbour was delayed by the departure of a larger commercial vessel. This caused the passengers waiting on the Albert Pontoon at No 5 berth to call the skipper at approximately 1010 BST to confirm whether the trip was going ahead and the departure time.

2.5.8. Shortly afterwards **Island Voyager** moored alongside the Albert Pontoon. The Skipper then met the passengers on the pontoon.

2.6 Pre-Sailing Briefing, passenger assessment and seating allocation:

2.6.1. According to the skipper, he gave the passengers a quick briefing on the pontoon concerning the weather conditions and what might be expected on passage. During this briefing waterproof clothing was issued, to those who needed it, and Inflatable lifejackets were given to all passengers. They were then assisted in donning their lifejackets before being allowed to embark. Passengers were then advised that the forward seats would be “bumpier” and the aft seats would be “wetter”, they were then permitted to sit where they wished. Less mobile passengers would normally be advised to sit towards the stern. The skipper maintains that passengers were advised that up to 6 foot waves could be expected at Noirmont.

2.6.2. No specific assessment of passengers' suitability for the conditions was made, with the skipper relying upon a statement in the Company terms and conditions. Passengers are expected to advise of any medical conditions and reminded that the trips were unsuitable for persons who are pregnant or who have a history of back problems.

2.6.3. Although it is a requirement for passenger “Safety Briefings” to be carried out prior to departure, It was standard practice on **IRV** RIBs departing from Saint Helier for the safety briefing to be carried out in the “Small Roads”, just outside the harbour. **IRV**, in practice, had a standard format for such briefings used by all skippers but this was not formally documented and no checklist or Safety Cards were used. The normal safety briefing covers the lifejackets used, what to do in the case of a person overboard situation, how to sit and hold on, and the use of foot straps. At the time of the incident, the briefings no longer included the vessel’s safety equipment as, according to the skipper, “it extended the briefing and passengers did not need to know”.

2.6.4. On this occasion, in the absence of a checklist, the skipper believed that he had covered these items on the pontoon; consequently, no safety brief took place in the “Small Roads”. Consequently, the safety elements, as opposed to those concerning the voyage conditions, were not briefed.

2.7. The voyage up to the incident:

2.7.1. On completion of loading the **Island Voyager**, with 14 persons aboard, departed Albert Pontoon (No 5 Berth) and passed through the Pier heads. No Traffic Report (TR) was sent to Jersey Coastguard on this occasion (neither had such calls been made from Island Voyager for the previous 14 days due to aerial faults on both which prevented VHF contact at less than 1NM or more than 6 NM. (See comments under findings). Replacement aerials had been obtained and were awaiting fitting, an additional hand-held VHF was aboard, but was not used for TRs, and a mobile telephone was also aboard).

2.7.2. Upon entering the Small Roads and assessing the conditions, the skipper decided that it would be more comfortable for the passengers if he routed the **Island Voyager** North of Elizabeth Castle to avoid head seas. This decision also avoided a known area of confused water to the West of Elizabeth Castle breakwater. He altered course accordingly and, once clear of the port’s 5-knot speed restrictions, increased to approximately 20 Knots, as recorded 1020BST by VTS. (**Island Voyager** although capable of 50 knots is restricted to a maximum of 35 Knots with passengers aboard). Once clear of the Castle, and as the vessel approached Noirmont, the conditions worsened and the skipper believes he reduced speed to 12-14 knots (although both the Island Voyager’s own GPS/AIS and the VTS Radar/AIS show no significant speed reduction). The skipper’s focus was on reading the waves ahead and not looking at his instruments.

2.7.3. As the vessel approached Noirmont Point the skipper decided to further reduce speed and adjust course, appreciating that for a period the vessel was going to be beam on to the conditions, “broad-sided”. The sea conditions off Noirmont were confused due to wind against tide effects.

2.7.4. At 1026BST VTS shows **Island Voyager** passing the Pignonet Cardinal Beacon to the East of Noirmont point at 19.3 knots before losing Radar and AIS contact. Contact was regained at 1027BST showing a speed of 16 Knots after which Island Voyager was seen to slow and proceed into Portelet bay

2.7.5 As **Island Voyager** rounded Noirmont Point, she encountered a pattern of approximately four larger waves. Witness reports vary, the first wave is reported to have covered everyone with water and the next two were also significant, before the fourth wave in the pattern caused the bow to drop and **Island Voyager** to slam heavily. (One witness estimates the height of the first wave as 3-4 feet the next pair as 5-10 feet and the last as more than 10 feet. Another witness reports that, as **Island Voyager** landed from the largest wave, the vessel was hit by a wave from the side).

2.8 The incident and Assessment of Injured Passengers:

2.8.1 The impact from the largest wave caused two young female passengers seated on the starboard "Jockey" seat to fall from their seats against the starboard tube. Both were able quickly to regain position unaided. The male passenger (Passenger A) on the aft "Jockey" seat on the Port side was lifted from his seat and impacted heavily with his seat. The lady (Passenger B) on the starboard side of the foremost bench seat also impacted heavily and complained of back pain.

2.8.2 Passenger A immediately called out in severe pain.

2.8.3 The Skipper's action was immediate; in significantly reducing speed and diverting the vessel into more sheltered waters in Portelet Bay. The skipper handed the con to his crewman and moved forward to assess the situation with Passenger A, who initially was complaining that he had lost feeling in his legs. The skipper conducted a number of checks, which showed full upper body movement and some feeling in the legs. The condition of Passenger B was then also assessed.

2.9 Actions following the Incident:

2.9.1 The skipper decided to abort the voyage and to return to Saint Helier at slow speed. Some passengers suggested that it would be better to go to the beach in Portelet and disembark the injured, or all, passengers. This option was rejected due to problems with vehicular access, and the need to move the injured passengers up numerous steep steps.

2.9.2 The **Island Voyager** rounded Noirmont point close inshore at slow speed and then crossed Saint Aubin's bay at 7-9 knots with the sea astern, again routing north of Elizabeth Castle. Initially no report was made to VTS or Coastguard. The skipper explained that he had spoken to Passenger A and offered to have an ambulance attend on arrival, but that Passenger A did not think it was necessary. The skipper remained in attendance with Passenger A, who was moved to the forward part of the port "Jockey seat" to be able to use the handhold (see Fig. 3) whilst a fellow passenger who is a physiotherapist changed seats to support Passenger B

2.9.3 As **Island Voyager** passed to the north of Elizabeth Castle, Passenger B started showing signs of distress and began hyperventilating. At this point 1053BST, the Skipper requested, by VHF to VTS that an ambulance attend on arrival.. The Duty Acting Harbour Master was notified and together with the Coastguard Watch Officer proceeded to meet the **Island Voyager**. It was subsequently reported that there were two casualties and a second ambulance was dispatched.

2.9.4 The skipper of **Island Voyager** failed either to reduce speed on entering the port's 5 knots limit, or to request permission from VTS to maintain speed; consequently, he went through the pier heads at 10.7 knots passing an outbound small fishing vessel whilst doing so. The increased wash caused the **Island Voyager** to roll whilst subsequently berthing on Albert Pontoon (No 5 Berth) when she arrived at 1056.

2.9.5 The Coastguard Watch Officer arrived on scene at 1058 and the first ambulance at 1106, The Duty Acting Harbour Master was on scene by 1110 relieving the Coastguard Officer. The Skipper was informally interviewed on arrival and requested to complete an Incident Report Form. The second ambulance arrived at 1115.

2.9.6 The two casualties were disembarked under the supervision of paramedics. Passenger B was transferred into a wheelchair and Passenger A onto a stretcher with both ambulances enroute to the hospital by 1135.

2.9.7 Passenger B was released after treatment, Passenger A's back injuries were however more serious and he spent nine days in hospital and requires further treatment.

2.9.8 After 24 hours, following confirmation that this was a reportable accident, due to Passenger A being still in hospital, the required notification was made to the Jersey Maritime Administration and a formal investigation was commenced by the Maritime Standards Department.

3.0 IMAGES



FIG 1 - Route of Island Voyager on the day concerned (Vessel GPS and AIS Information)




FIG 2 – Seating arrangement on Island Voyager; Passenger A was seated on the Port Jockey seat and Passenger B on the starboard side of the forward bench seat.



FIG 3 – Seating arrangement on Island Voyager;




FIG 4 – Island Voyager on-board Instrumentation AIS/GPS course and Speed approaching Noirmont




FIG 5 – Island Voyager on-board Instrumentation AIS/GPS course and speed passing Noirmont Point



FIG 6 – ISLAND VOYAGER – RETURNING TO SAINT HELIER



FIG 7 – ISLAND VOYAGER ENTERING PIERHEADS AT SPEED AND PASSING OUTBOUND FISHING VESSEL



FIG 8 - AN ALTERNATIVE SEATING ARRANGEMENT OF THE SAME CLASS OF VESSEL WITH INDIVIDUAL JUMP SEATS

4.0 FINDINGS

4.1 Regulations and Guidance:

4.1.1. The operation of small commercial vessels in Jersey is controlled through the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Regulations) 2012 made in pursuance to the provisions of the Harbours (Administration) (Jersey) Law 1961. This covers the carriage of passengers within the Island's territorial waters and between places in Jersey.

4.1.2 Following verification of valid vessel certification and proof of insurance owners of **Island Voyager** were granted a new permit by the Harbour Master, pursuant to Regulation 6 of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Regulations 2012 to enable the vessel to operate as a Licenced Craft between 31st January 2018 and 31st January 2019.

4.1.3 This permit required the owners to operate **Island Voyager** under the following conditions:

- Area of Operations: To sea within 20 miles from a safe Haven (Cat 4), Craft to be operated only in favourable weather and daylight only
- Craft to carry a maximum of 14 persons (maximum 12 passengers and 2 crew)
- Craft to be operated under the control of a person holding an appropriate RYA commercially endorsed certificate and a Jersey Local Knowledge Endorsement at all times and a second crew member deemed by the skipper to be suitably experienced who shall be fully briefed and be familiar with all emergency procedures
- Prior to departure on a voyage or excursion the skipper must provide all on board a safety briefing in line with Annex 7 of the Jersey Commercial Vessel Code of Practice (SIC)
- Passengers and crew to wear lifejackets at all times the vessel is in operation
- Speed of the vessel is to be limited to a maximum of 35 knots whilst passengers are aboard.

4.1.4 The "Jersey Commercial Code of Practice" referred to above is made under the Shipping (Safety Code – Yachts and Small Ships) (Jersey) Regulations 2013 made pursuant to the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2002 (as amended). The code incorporates the provisions of the UK Marine Guidance Note MGN 280(M) and the Annex 7 referred to above entitled "Skippered Charter Safety Briefing" reads as follows:

- 1 Before the commencement of any voyage, the skipper should ensure that all persons on-board are briefed, as a minimum, on the stowage and use of personal safety equipment such as lifejackets, thermal protective aids and lifebuoys and the procedures to be followed in cases of emergency.
- 2 In addition to the requirements of 1, the skipper should brief at least one other person who will be sailing on the voyage regarding the following: -
 - .1 Location of liferafts and the method of launching
 - .2 Procedures for the recovery of a person from the sea
 - .3 Location and use of pyrotechnics
 - .4 Procedures for operation of radio's carried onboard
 - .5 Location of navigation and other light switches
 - .6 Location and use of firefighting equipment
 - .7 Method of starting, stopping and controlling the main engine
 - .8 Method of navigating to a suitable port of refuge
 - .9 Location of stability Guidance Booklet and Stability Information Booklet (if applicable)

Safety Cards are considered to be an acceptable way of providing the above information.

4.1.5 In practice for **Island Voyager**, the elements in “Skipped Charter Safety Briefing” 1, above, must be briefed to all passengers before commencement of any voyage, and the second crew member must be familiar with those in “Skipped Charter Safety Briefing” 2 above.

4.2 Local Knowledge Endorsement:

4.2.1. The Local Knowledge Endorsement process is carried out to fulfil the requirements of Regulation 6 (3) (c) of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Regulations 2012 “that the ship will be manned by persons with sufficient local knowledge to make them competent to act for the purpose”. A Local Knowledge Endorsement is issued by the Harbour Master following a review of the candidates commercially endorsed Certificate of Competency and Medical Certificate and an Oral interview. This interview is conducted by one of the Ports of Jersey pilots against a defined checklist determined by the parts of the Island and type of vessels that the individual wishes to command. The examination includes elements of operational and safety procedures and legal requirements as well as Local Navigational Knowledge.

4.2.2. Limitations are placed on the LKE, depending the nature of the qualifications held and the results of the examination, it is not necessary restricted to vessels operated by a particular company. The LKE is aligned to the date of the Certificate of Competency. The Skipper held a valid LKE for Category 3 (20 miles from a safe haven) following examination on 30th June 2010. His LKE was renewed on 15th June 2015 after revalidation of his Certificate of Competency and was next due for renewal by 15th June 2020. He was therefore qualified to command **Island Voyager** and her sister vessel, in Jersey waters, Voyages to Sark or elsewhere within the 20NM limitation would be permitted providing any additional Sark or other requirements were met.

4.3 Maintenance, Survey and Inspection:

4.3.1 At time of the incident, **Island Voyager** had been appropriately certified by MECAL, a recognised organisation on behalf of the Jersey Registry of Shipping, and issued with a certificate under the provisions of the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code of Practice. The last out of water survey was carried out on 5th July 2016 and the final survey was completed on 11th July 2016. Apart from some minor hull repair work, which was completed in November 2016, the four remaining minor defects were addressed during the survey.

4.3.2 In July 2017 and July 2018 the process was completed on the basis of an annual report against the approved checklist confirming that the vessel was in a sound and seaworthy condition and the signing of from SCV2 (and addendums 1 and 2) by the owner to that effect.

4.3.3. The latest **Small Commercial Vessels- Codes of Practice, Declaration of Annual Examination by Owner or Managing Agent**, was dated 18th June 2018 with a survey date of 15th June 2018. It was signed by the Skipper as Company Director on behalf of the owners. This declaration did not contain any comments on vessel maintenance, damage, alteration or repair. No changes to the vessel and safety-related equipment were recorded. Following receipt of the above, MECAL issues an annual Decal for the displayed certificate.

4.3.4. The **Island Voyager** was issued with a **Jersey Small Commercial Motor Vessel Certificate** on 19th August 2016 on behalf the “Registrar of Shipping in the British Island of Jersey” valid until 4th July

2021 subject to a midterm examination by a MECAL authorised surveyor being carried out before 4th July 2019.

4.3.5 It should be noted that the above certificate contained a requirement that any damage detrimental to the safety of the vessel and any modifications (material change to the vessel or its equipment) be notified to the certifying authority.

4.3.6. Two relevant Inspectors notes were included in the July 2016 inspection report:

Code 13 Lifejackets fitted with reflective tape whistles and lights – (Ex Cat 4, 5, & 6)

Code 22 the seating is described as “5 bench seats capable of seating 3 people each”

Notes Code 22:

RHIBs that are operated at high speed carry additional risks. It is incumbent upon the operator to ensure that the skipper has the necessary maturity & experience to ensure the safety of passengers by thorough briefing & by assessment of the physical capabilities of passengers to safely experience the ride, with due regard to the ambient sea conditions. These capabilities must be continually assessed throughout the ride. Reference should be made to “**Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance**” (to which a link was provided).

Seating for passengers and crew should be appropriate for the vessels intended use.

It is the owner’s responsibility to ensure that persons have clothing & footwear appropriate for the intended operation of the vessel & due regard is paid to controlling the speed of the vessel in the prevailing sea conditions.

(Note: The “**Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance**” in turn refers to the ‘**RYA Guidance for Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft**’ to assist with the development of Operational procedures).

4.4 Seating:

4.4.1 As built, **Island Voyager** was fitted with five bench seats each capable of seating three passengers although the maximum permitted number of passengers was restricted to twelve. The Operating console at the stern contained positions for the Coxswain and a second crewmember. There is nothing specifically problematic about this arrangement because there are appropriate handholds for each passenger on the rear of the row in front (see Fig 3).

4.4.2 The Humber 10m class can be fitted with a number of different seating configurations to meet Operator’s requirements; all of which can be appropriate given suitable operating procedures. The **Island Voyager’s** newer sister vessel **Intrepid Voyager** was delivered with two “Jockey seats” each capable of taking two persons in place of the forward bench seat. A configuration also exists with 12 individual jockey seats in four rows of three (see Fig 8)

4.4.3 In 2016 **IRV** decided to have **Island Voyager** professionally modified by the original outfitter to the same configuration as **Intrepid Voyager** to give two identical vessels; however, as shown, no notification was made to MECAL of this change and the vessel’s SCV2 certificate was not amended. Had formal prior notification been made for the change, approval would have been granted.

4.4.4. For RIBs that may operate in rougher sea conditions, individual seating is generally considered preferable and “Jockey seats” can, in some cases, be considered an improvement on bench seats.

4.4.5 The problem with “Jockey seats” which seat two persons in line, as on motorcycles with pillion passenger; is that, whilst the forward passenger has a suitably positioned hand hold in front at a convenient height; the passenger sitting behind either has to use a hand hold on the seat back or, more usually, hold on to the passenger in front.

4.4.6 Any of the above seating configurations can however provide safe operation given appropriate assessment of the conditions, and **IRV** had had no significant incidents in the six years under current ownership/management. However, as recommended in ‘**RYA Guidance for Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft**’, in some cases consideration may need to be given to not using some seats and positioning passengers differently in marginal conditions.

4.5 Safety Equipment:

4.5.1 **Island Voyager** was properly equipped for the voyage concerned.

4.5.2 Lifejackets:

4.5.2.1 The **Island Voyager’s** SCV2 certificate describes the passenger lifejackets as “Premier Kru Sport Pro. Auto 15”. New lifejackets “Crewsafe Kru Sport Pro ISO – 180N Navy Automatic – LIF7401” were purchased and fitted to the **Island Voyager** in June 2018. This type is self –inflating and hydrostatically and manually activated like its predecessors. They are considered easier to wear and contained in an outer cover, sealed with Velcro strips. The new lifejackets, like their predecessors, were not fitted with crotch straps. Whilst in some circumstances crotch straps may be of benefit, they are not a requirement.

4.5.2.2. Prior to putting the new lifejackets into service **IRV** removed the water activated self-illuminating lights from all their lifejackets, as they had experienced many cases of self-illumination in the past with these and previous lifejackets. Although lifejacket lights are not required for vessels in category 4 like **Island Voyager** (which are restricted to daylight operations); changes in Lifesaving Equipment should have been discussed with the Certifying Authority. The provision of alternative, manually operated, lifejacket lights suitable for the new lifejackets could have been considered in to maintain illumination capability whilst preventing unnecessary activation.

4.5.3 Radio Equipment:

4.5.3.1. **Island Voyager** was fitted with two fixed VHF sets interfaced with GPS. About 14 days before the incident, problems were encountered with both the VHF radios on **Island Voyager**. It was increasingly found that communications at ranges less than one mile and between 6 and 12 miles were adversely affected. **Island Voyager** stopped making TR calls on departure and arrival to Jersey Coastguard. Tests were carried out with the **Intrepid Voyager** and a fault-finding process was commenced. The fault was traced to the aerials of both sets and replacements were ordered. The replacements were received on the evening of Friday 27th July but had not been fitted by the time of the voyage.

4.5.3.2. As an interim solution a hand-held VHF was carried on **Island Voyager** together with a GSM telephone, however neither were used to send TRs.

4.5.3.3. Although the intended voyage to Sark was longer and more exposed than those scheduled for the **Intrepid Voyager** on the 30th July no consideration was given by **IRV** to switching the vessels so that the otherwise identical, **Intrepid Voyager**, with fully operational VHF equipment undertake the voyage to Sark.

4.5.3.4. The new aerials were fitted to **Island Voyager** upon her return to St Helier after the voyage and resolved the issue. It is not clear why the new aerials were not fitted on receipt or at least prior to departure to Sark.

4.5.3.5. The skipper is clear that the VHF issues had no impact on his decision as to when to request assistance following the incident.

4.6 Safety Management System:

4.6.1. There was no statutory requirement under the code for **IRV**, as the Owners / managers of the **Island Voyager**, to have in place a formal Safety Management System and such a system did not form part of the vessel's certification inspection by MECAL. Neither was a Safety Management System a requirement for the vessel's operating licence as issued by the Harbour Master and inspection of any such system did not form part of the issuing process.

4.6.2. A reference was, however, made in the vessel's certification to the need to refer to the "**Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance**"

4.6.3 Had reference been made to the "**Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance**", the aim of which was to provide good management practice guidance for the operators of commercial RIBs (approved jointly by the UK MCA, MECAL, the RYA, the British Marine Federation, the Professional Boatman's Association, the Passenger Boat Association and STR.EU.Com), guidance would have been found in the following areas relevant to this operation:

4.6.3.1. Structural considerations

- Reference to seating and hand holds

4.6.3.2. Managing phases of passage

- Suitability of Potential Passengers
- Manning and Qualification Requirements
- Considerations once afloat
- Hazard Perception

4.6.3.3. Crew Training

- Scope of training
- Frequency of Training
- Training Records

4.6.3.4. Voluntary Auditing of Operation

- General approach to auditing

4.6.4. Annex A to the above document contained useful guidance on Hazard Perception and Mitigation, whilst the document also refers to the 'RYA Guidance for Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft' containing guidance to assist with the development of Operational procedures

4.6.5 At the time of the incident, **IRV** did not have a formal documented Safety Management System in place; The Company requirements and operational procedures were informally discussed between the three regular skippers and agreed in order to provide a degree of consistency whilst allowing the skippers flexibility to adapt to prevailing conditions. Thus, the interpretation of "Favourable

Conditions” was informally agreed and not documented. The absence of check-lists for briefings and emergency procedures meant that there was a risk of stages being omitted, as with elements of the passenger briefing prior to departure on the voyage concerned.

4.7 Human Factors, Hours of Work and Rest, Drug and Alcohol, Commercial pressure:

4.7.1 Hours of Rest:

4.7.1.1. **IRV** had no formal policies in place to ensure that skippers and crewmembers had rest equivalent to the requirements under STCW and MLC and so were sufficiently rested when reporting for duty. With respect to hours of rest, it is considered necessary for each crewmember to have at least ten hours rest in any 24 hour period, (the rest needs to be made up by no more than two periods one of which must be a continuous period of six hours). The average daily rest must be at least 11 hours so that a minimum of 77 hours rest is taken in any seven-day period.

4.7.1.2 When questioned the skipper admitted that it was a very busy period for him and that he had not had a day off in the previous week; however, he normally managed 8-9 hours continuous rest at night and in addition had carried out several trips to Carteret in France, where 2-3 hours rest could be taken at the destination. The skipper’s assessment was that he was probably just within, although admittedly close to, the minimum permitted daily and weekly rest hours.

4.7.1.3 The situation with respect to **IRV** crewmembers is that they remained within the acceptable work and rest hours because different crewmembers were used for the morning/midday trips and the afternoon/evening trips and crews worked no more than 6/8 hours daily. **IRV** did not provide guidance on the need for crewmembers to be sufficiently rested when reporting for duty.

4.7.1.4 The intended rotation for the skipper on the day was for a trip Jersey to Sark departing 1000 and returning in ballast, followed by a separate three-hour trip from St Catherine’s to Les Ecrehous on **Island Voyager** starting at 1430, before returning to Sark to pick up the morning group and returning them to Saint Helier. Whilst this would not itself have put the skipper out of hours, it was without doubt challenging in the conditions. Despite the fact that **Island Voyager** was permitted to operate at higher speed with no passengers aboard, there was also little time for the skipper to complete the round trip to Sark before needing to join **Intrepid Voyager**.

4.7.1.5 There is no evidence to show that fatigue was a factor in the skipper’s decision – making process.

4.7.2 Drug & Alcohol Policy

4.7.2.1 **IRV** at the time of the incident did not have a drug and alcohol policy in place and no specific guidance was given to skippers and crew with respect to alcohol or drug consumption. No one is permitted aboard **IRV** vessels, crew or passengers, who is obviously under the influence and the skipper is satisfied that both he and his crew member would have been within the alcohol limits for seafarers at the time when they reported for duty that morning and at all times thereafter.

4.7.2.2. Although no drug or alcohol tests were carried out on either the skipper or the crewmember on return to Saint Helier; there is no evidence to show that drug or alcohol consumption, on the part of either crew or passengers, played any part in this incident.

4.7.3. Commercial pressure:

4.7.3.1 The skipper was also a director of the operating company. Like many operators of small commercial vessels and fishing vessels, he therefore had a direct commercial interest on the success

of the voyage and in allocating voyages either to himself or to his part time skipper rather than allocating them to his third skipper who was on a zero hour's non-exclusive contract. He had allocated himself a challenging program with little time between voyages, even before the delayed start to the Sark voyage.

4.7.3.2. It is not considered that the decision to proceed with the voyage was influenced by commercial issues, neither is it considered that any conscious decision was made to push the vessel harder than would otherwise have been the case when transiting Jersey's South Coast because of the delayed departure.

4.7.3.3. It is possible that the call from the waiting passengers, together with the late arrival alongside the Albert Pontoon, led to a rushed briefing on the pontoon, a mistaken idea of what was covered prior to departure, and the consequent inadequate safety briefing.

4.8. Action prior to the Incident:

4.8.1. The decision for the vessel undertake the voyage to Sark on 30th July was made after consulting appropriate forecasts the evening before and again that morning. The actual conditions experienced were consistent with those forecast.

4.8.2 The decision to sail was not of itself unreasonable, but was boarder-line and required careful assessment of the wind against side effects, especially in the vicinity of Noirmont Point and Corbiere. The forecast was for improving conditions throughout the day.

4.8.3 There were a number of other routing options available to avoid the areas of confused waters between Noirmont and Corbiere. Routing around the east coast of Jersey was considered and discounted for good reasons. Routing initially further south, to pass south and west of the outlying rocks on Jersey's south coast, was not considered.

4.8.4 The decision was made to sail the **Island Voyager** to Sark with VHF radios not operating at full capacity: despite the required spare parts having been available for more than 48 hours, and the fact that the repairs were able to be completed in less than an hour after the voyage. Some additional measures had been taken to minimise the effect, however the situation made more necessary the use of a TR report for the voyage.

4.8.5 The required safety briefing to passengers prior to departure was inadequate and not in compliance with the applicable guidance for Weather Conditions and Passenger Safety Briefings. Whilst passengers were shown how to correctly fit their life jackets and provided with protective clothing, and whilst some indication was given as to expected conditions, appropriate guidance was not given as to how to sit or to brace themselves or on the use of the foot holds provided. Passengers were also not given the usual advice to raise one hand if they were in difficulty so that immediate action could be taken.

4.8.6 No assessment was made of the individual capacity of the passengers to undertake the voyage, and where best each should sit. **IRV** had no specific policies in place with respect to individual passengers in group-bookings, as recommended in the available guidance for small passenger high speed craft. Passengers were permitted to sit where they wished, and merely advised that the forward seats would be bumpier and the after seats wetter. Review of seating positions, especially the "jockey seats" right forward was not considered, but might have been appropriate.

Inadequate consideration was given to the fact that the limiting factor for the voyage was not the vessel, or the crew, but the individual group of passengers and their reaction to the conditions.

4.8.7 On leaving Saint Helier, the decision to route the *Island Voyager* north of Elizabeth Castle was reasonable, as was the initial increase in speed to approximately 20 knots.

4.8.8 The reduction in speed and the way in which the increasing waves were handled as Noirmont was approached were not fully effective. In particular, the guidance in the “ RYA Guidance Notes on Passenger Safety on Small High Speed Craft”, with which the skipper as an RYA Power boat instructor was familiar, states that “in approaching an area known to be hazardous in the prevailing conditions, stop and reassess your passage plan”. If followed, this guidance would have enabled the way in which the passengers were dealing with the conditions to have been assessed; and either the speed very much reduced or alternative action taken to enable the area to have been safely crossed. A decision to abort the voyage at this stage may have been necessary depending on the passenger’s reaction.

4.8.9 The **Island Voyager** rounded Noirmont point at a speed of between 16 and 19 knots and encountered a pattern of approximately four waves of increasing size, which caused heavy slamming. On the last wave, two passengers were injured. Two other passengers fell from their seats against the inflatable hull. Although these passengers were able to regain their seats unaided it is considered from witness statements that there was, for a brief period, a potential risk of these passengers falling overboard.

4.9 Subsequent actions:

4.9.1 As soon as the Skipper was aware that passengers were in difficulty, immediate action was taken. Speed was reduced to a minimum and the vessel motored towards more sheltered waters in Portelet Bay, the helm was transferred to the crewmember and the skipper proceeded forward to assess the situation. Passenger A, in great pain, explained that he could not feel his legs. Passenger A was requested to carry out appropriate movements, in order to ascertain the degree of movement or feeling. It was also ascertained that Passenger B had sustained injury.

4.9.2 It might have been prudent for the situation to have been reported to Jersey Coastguard as soon as the potential back injury was suspected, irrespective of the wishes of the individuals concerned.

4.9.3 The suggestion that the **Island Voyager** beach in Portelet Bay appeared reasonable, but the reasons for rejecting this and proceeding back to Saint Helier at slow speed were also valid. If contacted at this stage Coastguard and ambulance service advice could have provided additional support to the skipper, although he would have had the final decision.

4.9.4 Whether VHF communication between **Island Voyager** in Portelet Bay and the combined Coastguard and VTS Maritime Operations Centre (**MOC**) in Saint Helier would have been possible with the state of the equipment aboard the vessel at the time cannot be definitively established; but GSM communication would have been possible.

4.9.5 The decision to reposition Passenger A to the forward seat on the port “Jockey Seat” to provide additional support was sensible as was the seating of the fellow passenger who was a qualified physiotherapist next to passenger B. Both decisions were reasonable and in the best interests of the passengers.

4.9.6 The return voyage to Saint Helier was conducted appropriately to minimise motion, and maintain passenger comfort. Routing north of Elizabeth Castle was the best option.

4.9.7 The call for ambulance assistance when passenger B began hyperventilating was appropriate; however, as stated above, it should have been made earlier.

4.9.8 The skipper should have ensured that permission to exceed the speed limit was requested from VTS, if he considered it necessary for **Island Voyager** to enter the port of Saint Helier at speed. He should also have fully considered the self-generated wash effects on the berthing of **Island Voyager**.

4.9.9 It is considered that the Skipper should not have pre-empted the arrival of the paramedics in attempting to get Passenger A to stand and walk following **Island Voyager's** arrival alongside. Passenger A should have been requested to remain seated until medical advice was received.

4.9.10 There is no doubt that following the incident all the actions taken by the skipper were made in the best interests of his passengers.

4.10 Assistance provided:

4.10.1 The first aid assistance given to the passengers by the skipper was appropriate. The actions by the qualified physiotherapist amongst the passengers in assisting Passenger B were also most helpful.

4.10.2 Coastguard and VTS responded promptly and effectively, once requested to do so, and the States of Jersey Ambulance service provided assistance as expeditiously as possible. It is felt that it would have been better if they had been called on as soon as the potential extent of the injuries were suspected.

4.11 Location and tidal height.

4.11.1 Incident took place approximately 1 cable south of Noirmont Point Light. High tide was at 0849 BST at 10.14m with a tidal range of 8 metres. The incident occurred approximately an hour and a half after high water with a tidal height of 8.6m, a confused south and west flowing tide and a moderate SSW'ly wind.

5.0 CONCLUSION:

5.1 At the time of the incident the **Island Voyager** was appropriately certificated and of a type suitable for the intended voyage and her crew were appropriately qualified and experienced.

5.2 Like most incidents there was no single cause, this was the first incident of this nature with an experienced operator and a well-qualified and skipper with a previously good safety record.

5.3 The well-established nature of the operation and the use regular skippers and crew led to a reliance of informal procedures and experience which did not provide the appropriate prompts and checks to ensure that key decision support was available.

5.3.1. The above had the following results:

- Appropriate guidance and instruction was not given to the passengers before departure in order that they could take suitable decisions to safeguard their own safety.
- Modifications were carried out to the vessel and changes to the LSA took place without prior discussion with the relevant authorities;
- Faults with the radio equipment aboard were not reported although it remained operational and appropriate fault-finding took place and spares were obtained expeditiously to remedy the problem.
- There was a lack of urgency to complete the repairs to the radio equipment.

5.4 The current nature of the vessel certification process; and the fact that Local Knowledge Endorsements are, unlike Pilot Exemption Certificates, not restricted to vessels belonging to a single operator, mean that the Operational Safety Procedures of the operators of Small Commercial Passenger Vessels (of a type that do not require a formal Safety Management System) are not formally audited prior to vessel certification being issued under the **Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Regulations 2012**, in the same way as such procedures for the operators of vessels operated from a beach under similar permits.

5.5 The decision to embark on the voyage to Sark on the morning of 30th July was within the **Island Voyager's** permitted operational certificate but at the upper end of the operating envelope and thus required particular care and assessment of the passengers, before departure, and of the way that the passengers were reacting to the voyage whilst on passage.

5.6 The injuries sustained by the two passengers were caused by the **Island Voyager** slamming when transiting a series of waves of increasing height, whilst transiting the known charted area of rougher water off Noirmont. The judgement of transit though such seas is, to an extent, subjective in nature; it only takes the misreading of one wave for vessels of this type to impact to a degree that poses some risk of injury, even in moderate conditions.

6.0 ACTIONS TAKEN TO DATE

6.1 Formal Incident Investigation was commenced on 31st July. The Incident Report from the skipper of the **Island Voyager** was received on the same date, together with witness statements from the attending Coastguard Officer and the Duty Acting Harbour Master who attended the vessel on arrival.

6.2 On 2nd August 2018, interviews were carried out with the skipper of **Island Voyager** and one passenger. Additional witness statements were subsequently obtained from the second crewmember and three further passengers.

6.3 On 2nd August 2018, discussions were held with Island RIB Voyages (**IRV**) with respect to developing a more formal Safety Management System and appropriate checklists. Work on implementing such a system is now in progress.

6.4 On 2nd August 2018 Ports of Jersey issued Safety Bulletin No 6 of 2018 entitled **Pre- Departure and on-passage assessment of "Favourable Weather" conditions by the Operators and Masters / LKE holders of Commercially Operated RIBS**" to the owners and operators of all Jersey registered commercially operated RIBS.

6.5 On 6th August 2018, Ports of Jersey forwarded copies of the "Small Passenger High Speed Craft Experience Rides Guidance Document", with its reference to the 'RYA Guidance for Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft', together with a copy of the MCA's MGN 280 to the owners and operators of all Jersey registered commercially operated RIBS. Operators were requested to provide copies of the documents concerned to all their Local Knowledge Endorsement holders/skippers. All operators were advised to utilise these documents to review the extent of their Safety Management Systems.

6.6 **IRV** have advised that they are considering suitable manually activated lights for fitting to their new lifejackets.

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 To Ports of Jersey and the Jersey Maritime Administration:

- 7.1.1 That this report is published on the Ports of Jersey website once any civil legal action is completed and consideration is given to sharing the report with other administrations.
- 7.1.2 That an anonymised summary of this incident investigation report is considered for issue as a Safety Bulletin including lessons learned and recommendations.
- 7.1.3 That the annual review of each operators' safety procedures (as currently carried out by the Maritime Standards Department for Beach concessions conducting activities afloat) is extended to the operators of all small commercial passenger vessels. To be implemented prior to the annual issue of any Licenced Craft permits by the Harbour Master under the HARBOURS (INSHORE SAFETY) (JERSEY) REGULATIONS 2012 in 2019
- 7.1.4 It is recommended that such reviews should be carried against the recommendations of the **"Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance"** and **"RYA Guidance Notes on Passenger Safety on Small High Speed Craft"** or an equivalent standard.

7.2 To Island Rib Voyages:

- 7.2.1 That **IRV** continue work on a more comprehensive Safety Management System, including appropriate checklists, together with standardised safety, emergency and maintenance procedures, including training records and exercises and an annual internal review.
- 7.2.2 That **IRV** ensure that a passenger safety briefing to all passengers containing all the required elements is carried out before the vessel departs on each sailing and is documented.
- 7.2.3 That **IRV** ensure in future that any changes to their vessels or the equipment thereon are notified in advance to their Certifying Authority and that the information in form SCV2 is kept up to date.
- 7.2.4 That **IRV** ensure that any safety related defects on their vessels are properly reported in a timely manner and closed out.

7.3 To all operators of Jersey Registered Small Commercial passenger Craft:

- 7.3.1 That they implement a Safety Management System equivalent to that recommended in the **"Small Passenger Craft - High Speed Experience Rides Guidance"** and **"RYA Guidance Notes on Passenger Safety on Small High Speed Craft"** to assist in carrying out their responsibilities under the Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) law 1989

8.0

SUMMARY DETAILS FOR IMO REPORTING

SHIP PARTICULARS

Vessel's name:	ISLAND VOYAGER
Flag	Jersey
Classification society	MECAL
IMO number/fishing numbers	N/A (MMSI: 235039053)
Type	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
Registered owner	ISLAND RIB VOYAGES
Manager(s)	Owner/skipper
Construction	GRP Hull with inflatable sponsons
Length overall	10 m
Registered length	10 m
Gross tonnage	N/A
Minimum safe manning	14 Persons (2 crew and up to 12 passengers)
Authorised cargo	Max loading 1050Kg

VOYAGE PARTICULARS

Port of departure	Saint Helier
Port of arrival	Sark (intended), returned to Saint Helier
Type of voyage	Coastal Day Trip
Cargo/Passenger information	12 passengers
Manning	Skipper & One crew member

MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION

Date and time	30 th July 2018
Type of marine casualty or incident	Serious Marine Casualty
Location of incident	Noirmont Point, Jersey South Coast
Place on board	Port Forward "Jockey" seat (Passenger A) & Starboard side of foremost bench seat (Passenger B)
Injuries/fatalities	<u>Passenger A</u> : suffered serious back injuries resulting in a hospital in-patient stay for over 24 hours and requiring ongoing treatment. <u>Passenger B</u> : suffered from back injuries and exhibited symptoms of shock, taken to hospital but released following treatment.
Damage/environmental impact	None
Ship operation	On passage
Voyage segment	Departure phase, within Port Limits
External & internal environment	Daylight, wind SSW 17 knots, Ebb Tide (west flowing), Forecast waves 1.3m
Persons on board	14 (2 crew and 12 passengers)